Collaboration
Regulatory networks
Though there is some dispute about how far back the trend can be traced, there is wide agreement that current regulatory regimes are heavily reliant upon organizations of multiple partners with intersecting authorities and obligations. Such networks of regulatory governance can encompass companion departments and agencies, intergovernmental relations and partnerships with the private sector, both profit and non-profit. Among the doubts and concerns circulating around discussion of such networks is whether they are effective; democratically accountable, and whether public managers are properly trained and selected for the skills and aptitudes required to successfully exercise the horizontal management necessary for co-managing such networks.
Maher, Imelda, "Competition law in the international domain: Networks as a new form of governance," Journal of Law and Society, 29(1) March 2002, 111-136
Edwards, Paul, et al. "Public policy, the performance of firms, and the ‘missing middle’: The case of the regulations, and a role for local business networks", Policy Studies,23(1) March 2002, 5-20
Hall, Thad E., and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., "Shaping formal networks through the regulatory process," Administration & Society, 36(2) May 2004, 186-207
Following up on their earlier work
The author examines the emergence of transnational networks of competition officials and experts with regulatory responsibility under the conditions generally referred to as globalization. This emergence has occasioned the internationalization of competition law, and the networks have occupied three fields of operation: coordination of enforcement; technical assistance; and the development of overarching competition principles at the level of the WTO. Previous debates over the internationalization of competition norms have been characterized by early failures – largely resulting from the absence of networks – and the politicalization of competition policy within a UN context that saw the emergence of an OECD centred network. The current focus, asserts Maher, is on coordination and the development of a competition law regime at the WTO level, as spearheaded by the European Union. The U.S. has been the major disputant in this process, advocating instead bilateral arrangements restricted to agreements on regulatory enforcement and technical assistance. Maher argues that the influence and importance of networks have affected the evolution of this debate over the last ten years, leading the protagonists to modify their positions. Her analysis emphasizes the centrality of such networks to this aspect of contemporary international governance – though supplementing rather than displacing traditional forms of internationalism. Finally, Maher suggests that, while the networks may conceive themselves as technocratic, current pressures on international policy-making has required them to attend to the process aspects associated with the legitimacy requirements of democratic process.
Larouche, Pierre , "Coordination of European and member state regulatory policy, horizontal, vertical and transversal aspects," Journal of Network Studies, 5(3-4) September-December 2004, 277-93
The multiplication of competent authorities in the wake of recent regulatory reforms makes coordination a key issue. The author considers the need for enhanced coordination. He argues that in both horizontal and vertical dimensions a measure of regulatory competition can be advantageous. In the transversal (between regulatory frameworks) dimensions, however, coordination is needed. He concludes by examining the substantive and procedural/institutional measures available to ensure coordination.
Prosser, T., "Regulatory contracts and stakeholder regulation," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 76(1) March 2005, 35-58
The author examines the application of the concept of a regulatory contract in the analysis of UK utilities regulation. Due to both theoretical and political reasons, he argues that – even though contracts may be useful regulatory tools – there are serious problems in conceiving of regulatory relations in contractual terms. In UK utilities regulation, an early such emphasis on contract has been displaced by a model of stakeholder network.
Interjurisdictional competition
There are a variety of debates about the role of regulating competition across jurisdictions. A widely argued position is that such competition incurs races to the bottom, in which each jurisdiction reduces its standards to attract mobile capital investment, causing others to do likewise and creating a vicious cycle. Others point out that in some instances there is the possbility of virtuous cycles where those with the highest standards can create conditions in which firms meet those standards even where they're not required for the sake of simplicity and convenience.
However, others argue that such race-to talk neglects evidence that regulatory standards are only one small factor in a much more complex picture that explains why mobile capital chooses to invest (tax and utility rates, infrastructure, quality and cost of labour, health and education systems, etc.) Additionally, such race-to talk assumes a mechanical response of government's that actually have to mediate a wide range of influences and considerations in determining regulatory policy.
Gouldson, Andy, "Cooperation and the capacity for control: Regulatory styles and the evolving influence of environmental regulations in the U.K.," Environment and Planning, C: Government and Policy, 22(4) August 2004, 583-603
The author seeks to contribute to the broader debate on how to promote “better regulation” by examining the origins and influence of different regulatory styles. More particularly, he examines the extent to which economic theories of cooperation can help to explain the presence of the cooperative regulatory style that has long been associated with the implementation of environmental regulation in the United Kingdom. After reporting the results of empirical research that focused on these issues, the author concludes that cooperative regulatory styles are likely to depend upon: a) the presence of inter-dependencies between regulators and firms; and, either, b) the presence of trust amongst stakeholders; or c) the effective exclusion of those stakeholders from influence in the regulatory decision making process. Highlighting the importance of recent changes in each of these three areas in the United Kingdom, he explains the factors that have led to a shift away from a purely cooperative approach towards what has been termed a more “responsive” or “risk-base” approach. Recognizing that such changes have been driven by a desire to enhance the efficacy and the efficiency of environmental regulation, and by concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability in the regulatory process, the author concludes that such evolutions represent an important contribution to the debate on regulation and its reform.
Kunce, Mitch, and Jason F. Shogen, "On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(1) July 2005, 212-224
The authors construct a competitive inter-jurisdictional model that reconciles two recent exceptions to the “race to the bottom.” Their results suggest that since environmental rents from local production are likely not captured 100 percent by local residents, devolved command and control environmental regulation is inefficient. Moreover, faced with the reality of fiscal constraints, local governments adopt property tax structures that serve to compound inefficiencies. Within such a “second best” setting, if a jurisdiction under-provides non-environmental public goods and jurisdictional capital productivity and emissions are strong complements, a race to the bottom equilibrium is supported.
Radaelli, Claudio M., "The puzzle of regulatory competition," Journal of Public Policy, 24(1) January-April 2004, 1-23
The author argues that our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence, he claims, has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with “races” and “final outcomes” of conventional theoretical approaches and start modeling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.
Co-opetition
This phrase has been coined to capture both the relevance and interdependency of competition and cooperation in interjurisdictional regulation. This approach serves as a corrective to much of the "race to the bottom" (or "race to the top") discussion in the regulation scholarly literature. No government can act as freely as such economic models imply. International policy regimes provide rules of cooperation for regulatory competition that cannot be ignored. Thus, the effect of regulatory competition has to be assessed in the context of regulatory cooperation.
Radaelli, Claudio M., "The puzzle of regulatory competition," Journal of Public Policy, 24(1) January-April 2004, 1-23
The author argues that our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence, he claims, has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with “races” and “final outcomes” of conventional theoretical approaches and start modeling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.
IPAC Events
