Oversight
Meta-Regulation
The regulation of regulation: originally this term was used to address developments at the intersection of state regulation and self-regulation – government control of self-monitoring professional corporations.
Now it is being used to capture an intra-state process, though still reflexive, addressing the conflict between social and economic regulatory goals. Embodying any set of institutions and processes that embed regulatory review mechanisms on a systematic basis into the everyday routines of governmental policymaking. For example, Australia requires the application of a public benefit test to justify the maintenance of any public policy that prima facie restricts competition. This is the regulation of regulation: meta-regulation. It is institutionalized as a general mechanism of governance. IT is not a one-off reform, but an instantiating generally applicable, sector-neutral and continuously applied technique of regulatory reform.
Scott, Colin, "Speaking softly without big sticks: Meta-regulation and public sector audit," Law and Policy, 25(3) July 2003, 203-219
The author examines the audit explosion in Australia in recent years. He suggests that, given the constitutional function of public sector audits, emphasizing the regularity and legality of public expenditure, the recent re-emphasis on performance audit and evaluation of non-financial performance indicators, they are liable to be interpreted through the lens of the more traditional concerns. The roles of auditors as meta-regulators, exercising the capacity to steer the self-regulatory capacities of public sector organizations in respect of financial controls, is also examined.
Morgan, Bronwen, "The economization of politics: Meta-regulation as a form of nonjudicial legality," Social and Legal Studies, 12(4) 2003, 489-523
The author focuses on the current tendency to meta-regulation with its emphasis on regulatory review mechanisms that deploy economic rationality into the everyday routines of governmental policy-making. The social logic of meta-regulation is found at the intersection of an increasing legalization of politics and a growing reliance on non-judicial mechanisms of accountability. Meta-regulation’s political implications are found in the “economization” of regulatory politics: all competing ideas of regulatory choices, informed by concerns over need, vulnerability or harm, are displaced by the bureaucracy’s translation of social welfare into the language of market failure or distortion.
Compliance motivation
Compliance motivation is a concern for the conditions that encourage compliance of regulatees and how regulators my contribute to the creation of such conditions. Fear of inspection, peer reputation, consumer pressures and attitudes to government are among the considerations in the motivation of compliancne. The general thinking among those interested in compliance motivations is that purely voluntary processes are not enough and some tangible disincentive of potential enforcement is required.
May, Peter J., "Compliance motivations: Perspectives of farmers, homebuilders, and marine facilities," Law & Policy, 27(2) April 2005
The author addresses the role of differing regulatory contexts in shaping compliance motivations. These are examined for farmers and environmental regulation in Denmark, homebuilders and building safety in the United States, and marine facilities and water quality in the United States. The findings show that the influence of different regulatory practices and the relevance of normative and social considerations differ among these regulatory contexts. This calls attention to the need for more research on the interplay of regulatory arrangements and contexts in shaping motivations for regulatory compliance.
May, Peter J., "Regulation and compliance motivations: Examining different approaches," Public Administration Review, 65(1) January-February 2005
The author examines how traditional regulatory and voluntary approaches affect motivations to address potential harms to water quality. The traditional approach consists of governmental enforcement of mandatory requirements; the voluntary approach consists of government calling attention to potential harms and facilitating actions to address them. These approaches are best thought of as ends of a continuum rather than as the sole choices. Three sets of findings emerge. One, not surprisingly, is that traditional regulation is more effective than the voluntary approach alone. Second, deterrent fears and the sense of duty to comply are important motivations for action. Third, factors that account for the variation in each motivation for which inspections, peer reputation, and attitudes toward government are shown to be important considerations. These findings point to the duality of deterrent fears and civic obligations as motivations to address potential harms.
Fairman, Robyn, and Charlotte Yapp, "Enforced self-regulation, prescription, and conceptions of compliance within small businesses: The impact of enforcement," Law & Policy, 27(4) October 2005
Enforced self-regulation is increasingly used to control risks created by businesses. The authors examine the way that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) make compliance decisions when faced with self-regulatory and prescriptive law, drawing upon empirical research undertaken within food-industry SMEs. They evaluate the impact of enforcement approaches on compliance decisions and compliance levels, finding that within food-industry SMEs in the Unite Kingdom, compliance is conceptualized as the negotiated outcome of the regulatory encounter. This leads to heavily reactive decision making, in which the enforcer becomes the predominate driver, which poses huge challenges for the successful implementation of enforced self-regulation, and is an explanation for the lack of empirical evidence supporting deterrence theory in business compliance.
Anton, Wilma Rose Q., et al. "Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48(1) July 2004, 632-54
The increasing reliance of environmental policy on market-based incentives has led firms to shift from regulation-driven management approaches to proactive strategies involving the voluntary adoption of environmental management systems (EMS). Count data and quantile regression analyses reveal that liability threats and pressures from consumers, investors and the public are motivating EMS adoption and that consumer pressures are particularly effective in increasing the comprehensiveness of EMSs of firms that would otherwise be adopting a limited EMS. The authors argue that a more comprehensive EMS leads to lower toxic emissions per unit output particularly for firms with higher pollution intensity in the past. EMS results in reductions in both off-site transfers and on-site releases per unit output. Finally, they find that regulatory and market-based pressures do not have a direct impact on toxic releases but an indirect effect by encouraging institutional changes in the management of environmental concerns.
Take-up inducement
The use of incentives or prohibitions to encourage regulatees to take up particular processes or technologies.
Rosendahl, Knut Einar, "Cost-effective environmental policy: Implications of induced technological change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48(3) November 2004, 1099-1121
Cost-effective environmental policy generally requires that all emission sources be faced with the same tax. The author discusses how the existence of induced technological change may alter this result, if at least some of the effect is external to the firm. Focusing on Learning by doing (LBD) effects in abatement activities, it is shown that emission sources with external learning effects should be faced with a higher tax than emission sources with only autonomous technological change. By using simple numerical simulations, it is further investigated to what degree a cost-effective climate policy differs from a free quota market, under various assumptions about learning effects, diffusion of technology and environmental targets. The results indicate that optimal taxes may be significantly higher in the industrial world than in the developing world. Moreover, the industrial world’s share of global abatement may be much higher in a cost-effective solution than in a free quota market. The global cost savings of a fully flexible implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are further questioned, as potential spillover effects of technological growth in the industrial world are not internalized in the market.
IPAC Events
